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FUTURE INTERESTS -
TRANSMISSIBILITY OF CONTINGENT INTERESTS
Action to determine title to land. The parties litigant claimed
through the will of their ancestor. T, father of A and B, devised the
real estate in question to A, providing:
But should my son [A] . . . die without issue, then and in
that event the real estate devised to him herein, I devise to
my son [B] .... conditioned upon the payment by him of
Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars to each of my daugh-
ters ....
B predeceased A who died without issue. Plaintiffs claimed
title as the sole heirs and devisees of B. Defendants were the two
surviving daughters of T and the children of a deceased daughter.
The trial court ruled for defendants. On appeal, affirmed. B took
a "contingent remainder," which interest was extinguished by his
death prior to the happening of the event upon which vesting de-
pended - i.e., A's death without issue. Therefore, the plaintiffs
could not take, and the fee reverted upon A's death without issue
to the heirs of T. Schau v. Cecil, 136 N.W.2d 515 (Ia. 1965).
Although the Iowa court termed B's interest a contingent re-
mainder, an inspection of the devise reveals that B was to take, not
as a remainderman, but as an executory devisee.' Irrespective of the
words of art uced to describe B's interest, the case principally stands
for the proposition that contingent interests are not transmissible, a
rule apparently applicable to contingent remainders and executory
interest alike. By the adoption of this principle the Iowa court has
placed itself in the untenable posture of espousing a proposition of
law accepted almost nowhere for more than 200 years. 2
Once the common law had recognized executory interest as
valid, the courts apparently never much doubted that they were
descendible, 3 and ultimately these interests were held to be devisable
and assignable as well. 4 Contingent interest are freely alienable and
descendible by force of later English statutes.5
1A received a fee simple subject to divestment in favor of B, and a fee
simple, since it represents the totality of ownership, is incapable of supporting
a remainder. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.27 (1952). The difference be-
tween contingent remainders and executory interests are of dwindling importance
today. 1 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 273 (1950).
'See FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS 534 (1801); FEARNE, EXECUTORY
INTERESTS 422 (1795).
'Goodtitled Gurnall v. Wood, Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (C.P. 1740).
'Actually, the early rule was that contingent interests were not assignable
at law, Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B. 1613); Ful-
wood's Case. 4 Co. Rep. 64, 76 Eng. Rep. 1031 (K.B. 1590), although equity
would enforce an assignment for valuable consideration, Duke of Chandos v.
Talbot, 2 P. Wins. 601, 24 Eng. Rep. 877 (Ch. 1731). But see Doe v. Polgrean,
1 H. Black 535. 540, 126 Eng. Rep. 307, 310 (C.P. 1791) where there appears
dictum to the effect that contingent interests are assignable at law. The holder
of a contingent interest might also release it to the person in possession.
Lampet's Case, supra. Such interests were later held to be devisable. Jones v.
Roe, 3 Term Rep. 88, 100 Eng. Rep. 470 (K.B. 1789).
'Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c' 26, § 3; Law of Property Act,
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 4(2).
The English courts were initially reluctant to accept the con-
tingent interests as a complete estate, freely transferable and de-
scendible because they feared that the claims involved would afford
unique opportunities for the practice of champerty and maintenance.6
Thus these interests were viewed as "mere possibilities," not actual
estates, and the courts deemed them not to be entiled to the protec-
tion accorded vested or possessory interests. The subsequent piece-
meal elevation of contingent interests to the status they now almost
universally enjoy reflects the attitude of later courts which consider-
ed these fears unfounded. 7
In the United States, courts at an early date recognized the
transmissibility of executory interests.8 The rule as announced by an
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions is in accord with
this proposition,9 and only a very few decisions flatly maintain that
contingent future interests are never transmissible.10 Often these
contrary decisions are the result of confusing the issue of vesting
with that of transmissibility." Some courts seem inclined to imply
a condition of survivorship whenever a contingent interest is under
consideration. Other courts have attempted to dispel the confusion
by talking of "a vested interest in a contingent interest,"12 but have
succeeded only in adding to the muddle. A number of states have
enacted legislation making these interests descendible, devisable,
and alienable.'8
Some contingent interest are doubtless without the majority
rule. If a devise imposes a condition performable only by the de-
visee, or contains an implied or express condition of suvivorship,14
or a condition of survivorship to a certain date,1" or makes the per-
son in whom the estate will ultimately vest unascertainable until
"For a discussion of the consideration which caused earlfy English courts
to regard executory interests as suspect, see Lampet's Case, supra note 4.
'The destructibility rule is an example of the disdain with which the com-
mon law viewed contingent remainders.
'Barnitz v. Casey, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 456 (1812). See also 4 KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, § 284 (7th ed 1851).
'E.g., Kean's Lessee v. Roe, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 103 (1836), and cases cited;
Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N.E. 154 (1917); Wallhouser v. Rum-
mel, 25 N.J. Super, 358, 96 A.2d 289 (1953); Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629,
86 S.E.2d 256 (1955); National Bank of Charleston v. Wehrle, 124 W. Va. 268,
20 S.E.2d 112 (1942); Kidwell v. Rogers, 103 W. Va. 272, 137 S.E. 5 (1927.
See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 164 (1936); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§§ 4.73 - 4.74 (1952); SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 1885-1887
(2d ed. 1956).
"E.g., Farrar v. Bingham, 93 F.2d 252 (1937).
"See, for example, Smith v. Sweetser, 19 F.2d 974 (1927).
"In Hays v. Cole, 221 Miss. 459, 73 So. 2d 258 (1954) the court adopts
this phraseology.
"3E.g., OHIO CODE ANN. § 2131.04 (Rev. 1953), N.Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAW, § 59.
"Henkel v. Auchstetter, 240 Ia. 1366, 39 N.W.2d 650 (1949). Interest-
ingly, in deciding this case the Iowa court quotes with approval the following
passage from 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY 173
(1947): ". . . Contingent remainders may be conveyed, devised and inherited
as freely as vested estates." (Emphasis added.)
"Bladt v. Bladt, 191 Ia. 1344, 181 N.W. 765 (1921).
the contingency occurs, 16 the interest is not transmissible. Obviously,
if the interest is no longer capable of vesting, it is not devisable or
descendable. 17 The rule of transmissibility may thus be expressed:
contingent future interests are transmissible so long as the contin-
gency which will vest the interest is not attached to the person who
is to take, but is connected with or dependent upon some collateral
event.18
It is difficult to see how the instant case fails to satisfy the
above rule. None of the cases which the Iowa court cites as sup-
porting its conclusion seem in point. In each, the court found a
condition of survivorship implicit in the language of the gift over.19
No such condition is discoverable in the principal case. By the terms
of T's will, A received a fee simple subject to divestment in favor of
B as the executory devisee, and there was no condition imposed upon
B's interest which should take it from the general rule.20
MORRIS S. ARNOLD
TORTS - INSTRUCTIONS - UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
P was injured when D's brakes failed causing him to hit P's
car. D denied negligence and contended that the collison was an un-
avoidable accident. D requested and obtained an instruction on un-
avoidable accident in addition to an instruction on negligence and
proximate causation. On appeal, Reversed and Remanded. The un-
avoidable accident instruction was unnecessary because the defense
of unavoidability was merely a denial of negligence and proximate
causation. Therefore, ordinary instructions on negligence and proxi-
mate cause are sufficient. An instruction on unavoidability confuses
the jury by creating the impression that it is a separate ground of
non-liability, and confuses the proper manner of determining lia-
bility, which is considering negligent conduct, proximate causation
and injury. The court said it would have to be an exceptional situa-
tion before an unavoidable accident instruction would be permissible,
and in ordinary negligence cases such an instruction is reversible error.
Houston v. Adams, 239 Ark. 346, 389 S.W.2d 872 (1965).
"The transmissibility of this kind of contingent interest is discussed in
Huxley v. Security Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 206 33 A.2d 679 (1943). ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1947), which substitutes for a fee tail a life estate in
the first taker and a remainder in fee simple absolute in "the person to whom
the estate tail would pass" gives rise to this type of interest. See Fetters, The
Entailed Estate: Ferment for Reform in Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REv. 275, 289
(1966). In England, a contingent interest is devisable whether the testator be
ascertained as the person in whom the interest will vest or not. Wills Act, 1837,
7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 3.
"See generally Simes and King, Transmissibility of Future Interests in
Colorado, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1 (1954).
"Willoughby v. Trevisono, 202 Md. 442, 97 A.2d 307 (1953).
"Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Ia. 948, 162 N.W. 253 (1917).
""The condition that T's daughters receive $2,000.00 each is not a con-
dition so personal as to be performable only by the executory devisee, Marks
v. Marks, 1 Strange 129, 93 Eng. Rep. 429 (K.B. 1718). Also, the payment of
the money is probably not a condition precedent to vesting, but merely operates
as an equitable charge on the fee. Woodward v. Walling, 31 Ia. 533, (1871).
See also Sick v. Rock, 240 Ia. 584, 37 N.W.2d 305 (1949). For a collection of
the authorities, see Annot., 62 A.L.R. 589 (1929).
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